The Federal Trade Commission\u27s Deception Policy in the Next Millenium: Evaluating the Subjective Impact of Cliffdale Associates by Karns, Jack E. & Roline, Alan C.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 74 Number 3 Article 2 
1998 
The Federal Trade Commission's Deception Policy in the Next 
Millenium: Evaluating the Subjective Impact of Cliffdale 
Associates 
Jack E. Karns 
Alan C. Roline 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karns, Jack E. and Roline, Alan C. (1998) "The Federal Trade Commission's Deception Policy in the Next 
Millenium: Evaluating the Subjective Impact of Cliffdale Associates," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 74 : 
No. 3 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol74/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S DECEPTION POLICY IN
THE NEXT MILLENNIUM: EVALUATING THE SUBJECTIVE
IMPACT OF CLIFFDALE ASSOCIATES
JACK E. KARNS* AND ALAN C. ROLINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981, James Miller became Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and initiated agency action to alter the qualitative
standard used by the Commission to determine whether a business firm
had engaged in deceptive advertising. As an economist, Miller espoused
the view that the traditional "tendency to deceive" standard was overly
protective of consumers. As such, it deterred many firms from under-
taking advertising campaigns since they might be held liable merely
because a consumer could have the capacity to be deceived by the adver-
tisement.I Alternatively, Miller stated that the FTC should evaluate adver-
tisements according to a different standard. Miller argued that the focus
should be on whether a "consumer acting reasonably under the circum-
stances could possibly be deceived, as opposed to providing protection
by preempting an advertisement simply where any consumer might be
deceived.
The task facing Chairman Miller was somewhat daunting since the
traditional "deception standard" had been in place for nearly fifty years
and was supported by innumerable Commission and federal court deci-
sions. Nevertheless, Miller approached Congress with a request that the
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (FTCA) be amended so as to
* Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University. LL.M. (Taxation), 1992, Georgetown
University; J.D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S., 1974, B.A., 1973, Syracuse University.
** Assistant Professor Business Law, University of Minnesota-Duluth. J.D., 1987, M.B.A., 1984,
University of Minnesota; B.S., 1983, Bemidji State University
1. In his testimony before Congress in 1982, Miller stated:
There are specific problems with the Commission's definition of deception. First, the
definition is not clear, despite its 44 year history. The courts tend to give the Commission
very wide latitude and the Commission's own case law is not clear and consistent. As a
result, businesses do not know what they can and cannot do. Consumers do not know
what protections they do, and do not have. The Commission really does not know what
cases to bring and what not to bring, and the courts do not know which Commission
decisions to affirm and which to reverse. As a result, they tend to defer to the agency.
FTC's Authority Over Deceptive Advertising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transp., 97th Cong. 3 (1982) [hereinafter Advertising
Hearings].
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include his "reasonable consumer" standard. 2 He argued before a
Congressional Committee that the revised standard more accurately re-
flected a free-market system of business enterprise, and that the market-
place would adjust where advertisements deceived only a few consumers.
Simply stated, he claimed that firms which perpetrated such ads would
find that the free flow of information in the market would soon render
their campaign ineffective as word of the deception spread. As for the
few consumers who would be misled, their injuries were not sufficient to
justify federal intervention where it was clear that the vast majority of
reasonable consumers had determined that the advertisement was
deceptive on its face.
At the time Miller pursued this effort to establish a deception stan-
dard by statute, he was joined in the effort by the two Republican
commissioners. Likewise, he was opposed by commissioners who had
been appointed by the previous administration. Opponents argued that
the change represented a significant step back relative to consumer pro-
tection and that firms would minimize the impact of the new standard by
engaging in marketing campaigns that would push its interpretation to
the limit. Interestingly, Congress refused to act on Miller's request, and
accordingly, in October 1983, he and the other majority commissioners
issued a Policy Statement on Deception3 which effectively encompassed
the key points of the position advocated to the legislature. The effort to
rewrite the deception standard culminated in March 1984. Chairman
Miller utilized the Cliffdale Associates4 case to reject the "tendency to
deceive" standard and to adopt by case law precedent the standard
enunciated in the Policy Statement. 5 Cliffdale was a garden variety
deceptive advertising case in which the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
ruled against the company finding that its advertisements violated the
traditional standard. The company appealed to the full Commission, and
in an opinion written by Chairman Miller and joined by the other
majority commissioners, the ALJ's decision was upheld, but his reliance
on the existing standard was rejected. Instead, then Chairman Miller
stated that in the future the Commission would judge marketing practices
according to their impact on reasonable consumers. As such, five
decades of reliance on the tendency to deceive standard came to an end.
2. Miller recommended that a deceptive act be defined as a "material misrepresentation that: (a)
Is likely to mislead consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, to their detriment; or (b) The
representor knew or should have known would be misleading." Advertising Hearings, supra note 1, at
8-9.
3. See In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174-84 (1984) (Federal Trade Commis-
sion Policy Statement on Deception).
4. 103 F.T.C. 110(1984).
5. In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164-65 (1984).
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What followed the Cliffdale decision can only be characterized as a
monumental difference of opinion as to whether the qualitative change
in the standard would produce significant adverse results in terms of con-
sumer protection efforts. Free-market commentators such as Miller ar-
gued that the change more accurately reflected the manner in which the
Commission actually reviewed deception cases. More importantly, it pro-
vided private enterprise with a more workable standard in terms of the
risk assessment decision-making that typically goes into producing a
marketing campaign. However, opponents argued that Cliffdale repre-
sented the worst of legislating by administrative fiat, and was blatantly
pro-business in that it was forcefully promoted by one of President
Reagan's most ardent free-market advocates.
A decade has passed since the Cliffdale decision. Although much
has been written about the projected impact the case would have on the
Commission's deception enforcement policy, commentators have under-
taken a less thorough review of the actual cases decided since 1984.
This article addresses whether the focus now ought to be on determining
if this wording change was as cataclysmic as some commentators
predicted, or in the overall scheme, whether it is really the vigor with
which the Commission pursues its deception enforcement policy that is
more significant, regardless of the qualitative standard employed. Fol-
lowing a brief review of the development of the federal law of deception
through the issuance of the Cliffdale opinion, the subsequent case line is
examined in detail to determine any visible shift in overall impact on the
deception enforcement policy. Finally, some concluding remarks will be
offered regarding this ongoing controversy.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL DECEPTION STANDARD
A. "TENDENCY TO DECEIVE"
As originally enacted, Section 5 of the FTCA was viewed as supple-
menting the Federal Government's antitrust arsenal by empowering the
Commission to regulate "unfair methods of competition." The Com-
mission subsequently extended its jurisdiction over anti-competitive prac-
tices to include advertising, raising the issue for Supreme Court review in
the 1931 case, FTC v. Raladam.6 In Raladam, the Court issued a very
strict interpretation of Section 5 powers and directed that the only type
of advertising that fell within the Commission's agency purview was that
which impacted on or related directly to free competition. The connec-
tion between the advertisement and a resulting impact on competition
6. 283 U.S. 643, 649 (1931).
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was paramount to that of any discernible injury to consumers. As such,
commission jurisdiction could not be based solely on consumer decep-
tion.
Faced with more creative advertising campaigns which adversely
affected consumers, the Court revisited the scope of the Commission's
jurisdiction in 1934. In FTC v. R.F. Keppel and Brother7 the Court
examined a company's advertising practice of including coins in some
of its boxes of candy, thereby providing a young purchaser with the
incentive to gamble by way of recovering all or part of the purchase
price. 8 The Court was clearly troubled by the impact of the advertising
campaign on children, but was particularly conscious of the Raladam
precedent requiring that marketing practices have a direct, if not sub-
stantial, impact on competition in order to fall within the FTC's domain.
Finding the merchant's advertising to be an "unfair method of com-
petition," the Supreme Court left open a clear possibility that it might
allow an expansion of the type of business practice that fell within
Section 5.
In 1938 Congress responded to these rulings by passing the
Wheeler-Lea Act. This Act amended Section 5 of the FTCA by expand-
ing the Commission's jurisdiction to cover "unfair and deceptive trade
practices," regardless of any impact on competition. Although the clear
intent of the statute was to provide the FTC with authority to regulate
unfair and deceptive advertising, Congress did not provide any guidance
in terms of a working definition of "unfair" or "deceptive." This
interpretation was left to the Commission and to the federal courts.
Prior to 1938, the Court considered cases involving deceptive adver-
tising pursuant to the Raladam interpretation of "unfair methods of
competition." In FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co. 9 the Court held an anti-
competitive practice in violation of Section 5 since it had a "capacity to
deceive" the consuming public. 10 Over the next five decades, this deci-
sion established what would come to be known as the Commission's
traditional "tendency to deceive" advertising standard. Henceforth, the
Commission would look to the "impression made by the advertisements
as a whole," regardless of any actual harm inflicted on consumers. The
most important consideration was the propensity of the advertisement to
cause deception among the consuming public.
The case line that developed eventually distilled the traditional
deception standard into three component parts: 1) a marketing practice
7. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
8. F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 307 (1934).
9. 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
10. F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1934).
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having a tendency or capacity to deceive; 2) which was material to
potential purchasers; and 3) that gave special consideration to targeted
consumer groups, such as children. Qualitatively, the standard did not
require any evidence of actual injury to consumers, nor could respon-
dent companies defend their questionable campaigns with arguments
that they acted in good faith, had no specific intent to deceive the public,
or did not feel that the practice was deceptive when initiated. Further
cases even held that a firm could make representations that were
technically correct but which presented information in a manner that had
a tendency to mislead consumers, which was a violation of the traditional
standard. Cases of omission were judged to present credible claims of
deception since the missing information would be deemed "material" to
a potential purchaser. Perhaps the best illustration of the extent to which
the traditional standard could be taken was offered by one court which
held that even "the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous" were
worthy of Commission protection. It was against this backdrop in 1981
that Chairman Miller assumed what would become his pivotal role in
reshaping the federal deception standard.
B. "REASONABLE CONSUMER"
After taking over the chairmanship of the Commission, Chairman
Miller openly stated his preference for changing the traditional decep-
tion standard. In testimony before Congress in 1982, he argued that the
then-existing standard had significant adverse effects on consumers and
that the agency pursued complaints against companies based on minor
issues. The Commission had trivialized its deception enforcement policy
by prohibiting advertising practices that would benefit a clear majority
of consumers simply because a few consumers might be deceived. The
House Committee did not act on the suggested amendment to Section 5,
but did ask the Chairman to prepare a statement describing its enforce-
ment policy. As a result of this request, the Policy Statement was present-
ed to Congress in October 1983, and it incorporated the statutory
changes that had been previously advocated.
Based on its opinion that the Policy Statement was too argu-
mentative, the Committee directed the Commission to produce a state-
ment that presented a "definitive, neutral analysis." Miller prepared a
response to the Committee request, but it never attained any significance
in the process that was to define the new federal deception standard. The
Commission considered the Policy Statement to be a correct reflection of
the FTC enforcement policy, and it intended to rely on the document in
deciding future cases. Despite Congressional objections, no formal
action was taken to derail the Policy Statement and it was firmly
1998l 445
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entrenched by March 1984 when the Cliffdale Associatesli case was
appealed to the full Commission.
The company had marketed a device called the "Ball-Matic Gas
Saver Valve," which allegedly improved gasoline mileage on all cars
except Volkswagens and those with diesel or fuel injection engines.
Emphasizing the lack of adequate scientific substantiation for its market-
ing claims, the ALJ ruled that the firm must cease and desist from
making any gas mileage savings claims. The advertisements as em-
ployed by the company were ruled deceptive based on the theory that
"any advertising representation that has the tendency and capacity to
mislead or deceive a prospective purchaser is an unfair and deceptive
practice which violates the FTCA."12 On appeal to the Commission,
Chairman Miller affirmed the holding but rejected the AL's reliance on
the traditional standard as inappropriate. Instead, the Commission
majority stated that the standard as set forth in the Policy Statement
generally established the correct model for evaluating the efficacy of
advertising practices.13 The opinion was issued over a strong dissent but
received no formal reaction from Congress. Accordingly, Cliffdale
established the federal deception standard as one requiring the Commis-
sion to find that a questionable marketing practice is "likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances."
III. THE CLIFFDALE CASE LINE
A. THOMPSON MEDICAL COMPANY
The first application of the "reasonable consumer" standard after
the decision in Cliffdale occurred in the In re Thompson Medical Co.,
Inc.14 case involving advertisements for an over-the-counter topical oint-
ment called "Aspercreme." Since this case originated before the release
of the 1983 Policy Statement, the complaint was set forth in terms of the
traditional "tendency to deceive" standard.1 5 The complaint alleged
that Thompson had used deceptive advertisements which misrepresented
that Aspercreme contained aspirin, that it was a recently developed drug,
that it was more effective than aspirin tablets, and that the company
11. 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984).
12. Id. at 156.
13. Id. at 164-65 (opinion of the Commission).
14. 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086
(1987).
15. In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 651 (1984). The complaint stated that the
advertisements had the "capacity and tendency to mislead members of the consuming public into the
erroneous and mistaken belief that said representations were and are true." Id.
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possessed scientific evidence substantiating such claims.16 Finding that
the majority of the representations made by Thompson were deceptive,17
the AU ordered the firm to refrain from: 1) using the brand name
Aspercreme without also disclosing that the product did not contain
aspirin; 2) making claims that it was a new product; and 3) misrepre-
senting the results of any test or study to give the impression that they
had substantiation for their efficacy claims. 18
Although the deceptive practices alleged in the complaint would
likely have been found to violate the traditional deception standard, the
Commission took advantage of the opportunity to reinforce its adoption
of the new standard announced in Cliffdale just a few months earlier. 19
The opinion reiterated the rationale for the new deception standard in
terms of allaying the concerns of advertisers that they might be held
liable for unreasonable interpretations. 20 After establishing Cliffdale as
the controlling precedent, Commissioner Douglas addressed the three
elements of the reasonable consumer standard: 1) whether Thompson
made the alleged representations; 2) whether the representations were
material; and 3) whether the claims were likely to mislead consumers
acting reasonably under the circumstances. 21
Dispensing quickly with the four representations which Thompson
acknowledged that it had made, 22 the Commission turned to the claims
alleged in the complaint which were implied by the company's advertise-
ments. 23 In addressing the allegation that a number of Thompson's
16. Id. at 650 (complaint).
17. Id. at 787. The AU found that Thompson's claim that the use of Aspercreme will result in no
side effects was not deceptive. Id.
18. Id.
19. Commissioner Bailey dissented from the application of the new standard in In re Thompson
Med. Co., Inc. as she had in In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., although she acknowledged that the
company's practices would be deceptive under either the old or the new standard. Id. at 788 n. 4.
20. Id. at 788.
21. Id. The In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc. opinion follows very closely Chairman Miller's discus-
sion of the three elements set forth in the In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc. case which were deemed neces-
sary for the Commission to find an act or practice deceptive. See generally In re Cliffdale Assocs.,
Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984).
22. These four acknowledged claims included:
I) Aspercreme is an effective drug for the relief of minor arthritis and its symptoms;
2) Aspercreme is as effective a drug as orally-ingested aspirin for the relief of minor
arthritis and its symptoms;
3) Aspercreme is an effective drug for the relief of rheumatic conditions and their
symptoms; and
4) Aspercreme acts directly penetrating through the skin to the site of the arthritic
disorder.
In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 791.
23. These four implied claims included:
I) Aspercreme contained aspirin;
2) Aspercreme was a recently developed drug;
3) Aspercreme was more effective than aspirin tablets; and
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advertisements represented that Aspercreme contains aspirin, the Com-
mission focused on the "net impression" likely conveyed to consumers
regarding the aspirin content of the product, 24 and what consumers
interpret the word "aspirin" to mean. Based on its own analysis of the
advertisements and the reference to extrinsic evidence, 25 the opinion
concluded that a majority of the company's advertisements were likely
to give consumers who interpreted them reasonably, the net impression
that Aspercreme contained aspirin.26
Thompson contested the ALJ's conclusion that the advertisements
in question conveyed an implied message that Aspercreme contained
aspirin. However, the firm argued in the alternative that such represen-
tations should not be considered deceptive because consumers under-
stand the term "aspirin" to mean a generic reference to pain relieving
analgesics, rather than to any specific ingredients. As such, Thompson
claimed that if such a representation was made, it should be interpreted
as referring only to the pain relieving properties of Aspercreme rather
than implying the existence of any specific ingredients. In deciding
what interpretation a reasonable consumer would make, the Commission
found three factors persuasive. First, Thompson's own advertisements re-
peatedly distinguished between aspirin and Aspercreme, thus indicating
that aspirin is not a reference to all analgesics. Second, the dictionary
definition of the word "aspirin" does not define it as a generic refer-
ence to all pain killers. Finally, the advertising of non-aspirin analgesics
makes it unlikely that reasonable consumers would equate aspirin with
analgesics .27
4) Thompson had substantiation for its claims that Aspercreme was effective.
Id. at 650 (complaint).
24. The Commission described the two-part process of evaluating whether an advertisement
contains implied claims as follows:
One is to look at evidence from the advertisement itself. We often conclude that an
advertisement contains an implied claim by evaluating the contents of the advertisement
and the circumstances surrounding it . . . If our initial review of evidence from the
advertisement itself does not allow us to conclude with confidence that it is reasonable to
read an advertisement as containing a particular implied message, we will not find the ad
to make the implied claim unless extrinsic evidence allows us to conclude that such a
reading of the ad is reasonable. For example, in this case the conflicting messages in
some elements of Aspercreme's ads caused us to examine extrinsic evidence to
determine what net impression(s) the entire ad could reasonably be interpreted as giving
to consumers.
Id. at 789.
25. Id. at 794. Extrinsic evidence considered by the FTC included: testimony by marketing
experts employed by Thompson, a consumer survey, and a Video Storyboard Test. Id.
26. Perhaps because of the strong implications created by the brand name "Aspercreme," the
only ads found not to create a net impression that Aspercreme contained aspirin were two which
repeatedly contrasted Aspercreme with aspirin and used phrases such as "aspirin-like" and
"non-aspirin" pain reliever. Id. at 800.
27. Id. at 809-10.
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Reviewing the allegation that Thompson had represented that Asper-
creme was superior to aspirin, the Commission found that Thompson
expressly claimed, in seven of its advertisements, that its product was
more effective because it provides faster relief than aspirin tablets with-
out the attendant side effects. 28  Relative to the representation that
Thompson had evidence substantiating the efficacy claims, the complaint
charged that the company improperly claimed a particular level of
substantiation and that it made objective product claims implying the
existence of substantiation without representing a particular level. 29
Thompson expressly represented that it had a particular level of substan-
tiation in three ads which made reference either to tests by a medical
specialist, to "clinical tests," or stated that the product was "clinically
proven." None of these claims were supported by scientifically accept-
able evidence. 30 Although the Commission did not find any other
express or implied claims of a particular level of substantiation, it noted
that advertisements which, make objective product claims must be
supported by a "reasonable basis." The Commission concluded that
Thompson's efficacy claims were objective product claims which went
beyond mere "puffing," which is not generally considered the type of
affirmative product claims for which documentation is normally expect-
ed. The Commission also found that the claims implied the existence of
a reasonable basis which was not supported by the record. 31
The next issue addressed was the materiality of the representations.
After defining a material misrepresentation or practice as "one that is
28. However, the Commission rejected the conclusion of the ALJ that three other ads impliedly
made such superiority claims:
a simple examination of the ads does not provide us with the sufficient information to
determine whether reasonable consumers come away from these ads with the impression
[of superiority]. Therefore, this is a situation where we require extrinsic evidence
before we can conclude with confidence that the ads imply Aspercreme is superior to
aspirin ....
After reviewing the record, the Commission could not find sufficient probative evidence to support the
AL's opinion that the ads made such superiority claims. Id. at 812.
29. Id. at 650-51 (complaint). The requirement that advertisers making representations of spe-
cific levels of substantiation actually have that level of substantiation, and that making objective claims
which imply the existence of substantiation have at a minimum a "reasonable basis" for making such
claims is commonly referred to as the advertising "Substantiation Doctrine." This doctrine was first
established in In Re Pfizer, 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972), wherein the Commission ruled a lack of such a basis
was an unfair practice in violation of the FTCA. The failure to have a reasonable basis was later
found to also constitute a deceptive practice in violation of the FTCA in National Dynamics Corp., 82
F.T.C. 488 (1973), aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 993 (1974).
30. In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 820-21. The Commission requires an advertiser
who makes an express claim to possess a particular level of substantiation which has sufficient
corroborating evidence. Id.
31. "Puffing," or an opinion that is so obviously exaggerated that any reasonable consumer
should know that it was not reliable, is not covered by the deception standard. Porter & Dietsch, Inc.
v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
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likely to affect a consumer's choice of or conduct regarding a pro-
duct," 32 the Commission next looked to the traditional presumptions of
materiality made in the case of express claims and those implied claims
deliberately made by an advertiser. Following prior case precedent,
Thompson's express claims regarding Aspercreme's efficacy, its superi-
ority to aspirin, and the possession of substantiation evidence were
determined to be presumptively material. 33
As for the implied claims, the opinion focused on the claims that
Aspercreme contained aspirin and that it was a newly developed product.
Implied claims generally pertain to the central characteristics of a pro-
duct or service, such as safety, efficacy, or cost. Since Thompson's
claims did not fit into any of these categories which are presumed by the
FTC to be material, the Commission analyzed the facts on the record to
determine whether or not a "reasonable consumer" would consider the
claims to be important. 34 The opinion reaffirmed the ALJ's determina-
tion that, based on studies which showed significant consumer preference
for aspirin over non-aspirin products for treatment of minor arthritic
pain, the representations should be considered material. Although the
ALJ failed to specifically address his rationale for determining that the
new product claims were material, such claims must be considered
material because they implied product efficacy to arthritis pain sufferers
who could be expected to "enthusiastically try new remedies in the hope
that these remedies will provide relief beyond what they are obtaining
from existing remedies." 35
In addressing the reasonableness element of the new deception
standard, the Commission stated that although Thompson made a variety
of express and implied claims that were material to reasonable con-
sumers, the claims may not be deceptive if they are accurate and are
not likely to mislead. 36 Two methods have been used for evaluating
32. In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 816.
33. Id. Although the Commission stated that such claims were presumptively material, it was
cautious to note that:
"we do not use our presumptions as an inflexible rule that eliminates our need to look at
materiality on a case-by-case basis. On the contrary, the presumption simply reflects our
general judgment that substantive claims in advertisement (in other words, claims other
than "puffery" or window dressing) would not have been made except to affect a
consumer's choice regarding a product."
Id. at 816 n.45.
34. Id. at 817. See, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d
Cir. 1984); In re Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984); In re
J.B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481 (1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
35. In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 817.
36. The Commission provided something of a forecast of its yet to be delivered opinion in In re
International Harvester Co. by referencing deception by omission: "Commission precedent also treats
as likely to mislead both practices conveying a material false impression and omissions of material
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whether representations are likely to mislead. First, the FTC may simply
show that the claims made were false. In the instant case, the Commis-
sion concluded that two of the implied claims were clearly false and
would be likely to mislead a consumer who was acting reasonably.
These claims included statements that Aspercreme contained aspirin and
that Thompson possessed clinically valid tests supporting its efficacy
representations .37
The second method for evaluating the likelihood that a representa-
tion may mislead, and which was applied to the efficacy claims in this
case, permits the FTC to show that the advertiser lacked a reasonable
basis for asserting that the message contained in the advertisement was
true. 38 Although Thompson did not imply a particular level of substan-
tiation through their objective product claims, by merely making the
claims there was the implication that a reasonable basis existed. The
record was insufficient for the Commission to conclude that the claims
were false. However, in accordance with the agency's policy statement
on advertising substantiation, the Commission determined that the
company did not have a reasonable basis for its efficacy claims. 39
B. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY
Unlike the Cliffdale and Thompson cases, in In re International Har-
vester Co.,40 the Commission was faced with a seller's omission rather
than an express or implied representation made in an advertisement.
More specifically, the issue was when and under what circumstances does
a manufacturer have a duty to notify customers about hidden hazards in
its products. Harvester manufactured and marketed a line of gasoline-
powered farm tractors which occasionally experienced a condition called
"fuel geysering." Fuel geysering occurs when gasoline is heated to
information doing the same." Id. at 818 n.51.
37. Id. at 819-21.
38. The Commission stated that this method of proof is only available for objective product
claims, such as "X is true." The burden could then be sustained by either proving X is false, or show-
ing that the substantiating evidence possessed by the advertiser did not provide a reasonable basis for
the claim. Id. at 819 n.52.
39. The Commission formalized its requirement of a reasonable basis for advertising claims first
established in In re Pfizer, Inc. through the issuance of an FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising
Substantiation. See In re Thompson, 104 F.T.C. at 839. This Policy Statement set forth six factors
which the Commission would evaluate and weigh in determining what level of substantiation is
necessary to satisfy the reasonable basis requirement:
1. The product involved;
2. The type of claim;
3. The benefits of a truthful claim;
4. The ease of developing substantiation for the claim;
5. The consequences of a false claim; and
6. The amount of substantiation experts in the field would agree is reasonable.
Id. at 839-42.
40. 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
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extreme temperatures due, in part, to the proximity of the fuel tank to
the engine, and is forced out under extreme pressure through an im-
properly loosened cap. Hot gasoline would then spray up into the air as
much as twenty feet from the tractor, sometimes landing on the operator
or even spontaneously igniting. 41 Such incidents occurred at least ninety
times and resulted in twelve serious burn injuries and one death. 42
Harvester apparently knew of the conditions for seventeen years before
notifying its customers of the potential danger, even though there was
evidence that the accidents could have been avoided entirely by the
operators if they followed certain safety precautions.
The ALJ found that Harvester's omission was its failure to issue
proper warnings to its customers and constituted both "unfair and
deceptive acts and practices" in violation of Section 5 of the FTFCA.43 In
an opinion written by Commissioner Douglas, the full Commission
reversed the AL's finding with respect to the deception charge, noting
that the terms "unfair" and "deceptive" are not synonymous. 44 Ha-
rvester's omission was found only to have violated Section 5 of the Act
as an unfair practice since it: 1) created a serious consumer injury; 2)
the injury exceeded any offsetting consumer benefits; and 3) the
consumer could not have reasonably avoided that particular type of
injury. 45 Rejecting the AL's conclusion that Harvester's omission was
also deceptive, the Commission stated:
While failure to disclose certain material facts may cause con-
sumer injury and lead to liability under Section 5, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the circumstances under which
such omissions are deceptive-in that they are likely to cause
injury to consumers by affirmatively misleading their informed
choice and the circumstances under which they amount to an
unfair practice-one which causes substantial, unavoidable in-
jury to consumers that is not outweighed by any countervailing
benefits.46
41. In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1051 (1984).
42. Id. at 1052.
43. Id. at 1049.
44. An unfairness doctrine has evolved in a separate case line. The concept of "unfairness" sub-
sumes the Commission's deception doctrine and holds a practice to be unfair if it: 1) offends public
policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise; 2) is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous; or 3) causes substantial injury to consumers, or competition, or other
businessmen. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8351 (1964); see F.T.C. v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922);
F.T.C. v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). The above factors were judicially endorsed by
the Supreme Court in F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).
45. In re International Harvesters Co., 104 F.T.C. at 1064.
46. Id. at 1050-51.
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As the Commission reviewed the law of deception to be applied in
the case, it restated and elaborated the three elements set forth in the
1983 Policy Statement. First, there must be a representation, practice, or
omission that is likely to mislead the consumer, the Commission noted
that although there must be some evidence which shows a likelihood of
misleading the consumer, there is no requirement that the evidence show
an actual false belief held by a consumer. 47 The second element re-
quired that consumers act reasonably. The Commission clarified that the
standard requires only that consumers act in a way consistent with the
"broad range of ordinary or average people." 48 Only if the represen-
tations are targeted to a specific audience will the reasonable consumer
be considered a representative of that group. 49 The third element ad-
dresses the fact that the misleading effects must be material. The Com-
mission noted that the "effect" with which they are concerned is the
distortion caused to the "ultimate exercise of consumer choice." This
distortion opens the door to claims that omissions, as well as false and
misleading statements, fall under its theory of deception.
This case was unique in that it was the first case after the 1983
Policy Statement to address the deception standard in the context of
omissions rather than false or misleading representations. As such, it pro-
vides additional insights into the Commission's application of the new
deception standard in omission cases. Before deciding that the omission
here was not deceptive, the Commission acknowledged that a deception
action can reach seller omissions in two instances. First, deception may
occur if the seller tells only a half truth and fails to disclose qualifying
information necessary to prevent an affirmative statement from creating
a misleading impression. 50 Second, deception can also occur where the
seller remains silent if he or she does so under circumstances that make
such silence the equivalent of an implied but false representation. Such
circumstances could arise either where the product appearance, surround-
ing circumstances of a specific transaction, or ordinary consumer
expectations of minimum performance standards create an implied but
false representation and the seller takes no remedial action. The Com-
mission explicitly recognized that the very act of offering goods for
sale creates a representation that they are reasonably fit for their intend-
ed uses. The Commission even went so far as to admit that this may
include a further implied representation that the products are free of
47. Id. at 1056.
48. Id. at 1057.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing P. Lorillard Co. v. F.T.C, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. (1950s)).
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gross safety hazards, although not that the product was necessarily free
of all or relatively improbable dangers. 5 1
This latter comment addressing gross safety hazards was particularly
important when considered within the context of the overall decision. In
establishing that the deception can encompass omissions in two circum-
stances, the Commission distinguished these "non-pure" omissions
from a new category of "pure" omissions where the seller has said
nothing and such silence has no particular implied meaning. Harvester's
omission of the warning information was considered a "pure" omission
which did not constitute a misrepresentation under the reasonable
consumer standard, and therefore, could not amount to deception. To
rule otherwise would create a tremendous economic burden on sellers to
consider all potential consumer interpretations in order to avoid a
deception charge, and that in these cases corrective disclosures would not
necessarily be in the public interest. 52
In applying the cost-benefit analysis to the facts of the instant case,
the Commission held that Harvester's silence was not deceptive since the
risk of harm was slight 53 and that the use of the tractor could not be
considered "inherently unreasonable or imprudent." 54 Therefore, the
omissions in this case did not rise to the level of a breach of an implied
warranty of fitness, and thus did not meet the first element of the
deception standard. This establishment of a new cost-benefit analysis
which must result in a net gain to consumers before the case will
"qualify for the streamlined legal procedures of a deception action" 55
51. Id. at 1058-59.
52. The Commission stated:
If we ... were to proceed under a deception theory without a cost benefit analysis,
it would surely lead to perverse outcomes. The number of facts that may be material to
consumers-and on which they may have prior misconceptions-is literally infinite.
Consumers may wish to know about the life expectancy of clothes, or the sodium content
of canned beans, or the canners' policy on trade with Chile. Since the seller will have no
way of knowing in advance which disclosure is important to any particular consumer, he
will have to make complete disclosures to all . . . There are literally dozens of ways in
which one can be injured while riding a tractor, not all of them obvious before the fact,
and under a simple deception analysis these would presumably all require affirmative
disclosure. The resulting costs and burden on advertising communication would very
possibly represent a net harm for consumers.
Id. at 1059-60.
53. The geysering accident rate was less than .001% over a 40 year period. Id. at 1063.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1064. In a 'footnote, the Commission attempted to distance itself from prior agency
decisions which found deception in cases where there was a similar non-disclosure of a safety risk
that was quite improbable, but also quite serious. Rejecting those cases as precedents, the Commission
stated:
These cases are from the 1950s and early 1960s, however. They date from a time when
unfairness law was poorly developed, and when, for the most part, a case had to be
described in terms of deception if it was to be brought within the FTC Act at all. Without
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was particularly disturbing to Commissioner Bailey. Commissioner
Bailey dissented from this portion of the decision, calling the approach
"entirely novel and nearly incomprehensible." 56
C. SOUTHWEST SUNSITES, INC.
Less than one month after the final order in International Harvester,
the Commission issued another opinion in the third case in the Cliffdale
case line, In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc. 57 In this case the company,
along with four other respondents, was charged with deceptively market-
ing certain parcels of land in West Texas. More specifically, the com-
plaint alleged that Southwest had:
1) misrepresented that the parcels were good investments
involving little or no financial risk and failed to disclose
material information regarding their financial risk; 2) misrepre-
sented that the properties were suitable for use as homesites,
farms, and ranches and failed to disclose material facts regard-
ing the suitability of the properties for such uses; and 3)
refused to refund the sales proceeds of parcels that were of
little or no value.58 Misrepresentations also alleged to have
been made by Southwest included that the land had the poten-
tial for commercial development and thus increased resale
values, because "oil production was underway" in the area.
The commercial prospects for the property were further
supported by an "oil map" which was given to prospective
purchasers and by references to the possible construction of a
nuclear power plant. 59
Following a hearing the complaint was dismissed. Although the
broker retained by Southwest had misrepresented the nature and value of
the investments, Southwest was held not liable under Section 5 of the
FTCA. The company took actions to correct the situation, including a
in any way questioning the substantive outcome of those cases, therefore, we suggest that
if they were brought today they would be brought under an unfairness theory.
Id. at 1064 n.53.
56. Commissioner Bailey stated:
I dissent because the Commission has concluded that Harvester's conduct, while unfair,
was not deceptive. In order to reach that conclusion, the Commission has adopted an
entirely novel and nearly incomprehensible theory of the law of deception. This is not a
complicated case. It is a straightforward example of a manufacturer's duty to warn
customers of a latent safety hazard in its product. But the Commission today decides that
failure was not deceptive because it involved a "pure omission" of material fact, which
according to this opinion is not a deceptive act or practice.
Id. at 1077.
57. 105 F.T.C. 7 (1985).
58. In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. 7, 10-11 (1985) (complaint).
59. Id. at 115-16.
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liberal refund policy and the termination of the brokers who had sold
the land parcels. 60 The ALJ further determined that the deception
charges were unwarranted because there were no "insurmountable ob-
stacles" preventing the use of the parcels as homesites, and that infor-
mation relating to costs of development had been sufficiently disclosed
to the buyers. The ALJ reasoned that he could not conclude that the
parcels were of "little or no value," particularly since he had found that
they could feasibly be used as homesites. This meant that Southwest had
obtained the money for the properties lawfully, and as such, retention of
the sales proceeds was not an unfair trade practice. 6 1
On appeal, the ALJ's decision was unanimously overturned. Com-
missioner Bailey, writing for the Commission, evaluated each of the
claims alleged in the complaint. The opinion first analyzed the claim
that the respondents had represented that the land was a good, profitable,
safe, and an easily resold investment with little or no risk of loss. Since
many of these representations were express and their meanings clear,
consumers would have reasonably interpreted that these claims were
made. With respect to the implied representations alleged, Commissioner
Bailey reaffirmed the Commission's "net impression" approach pre-
viously discussed in Thompson,62 stating:
Other representations were implied and required the Commis-
sion to determine how consumers reasonably would have
interpreted them. We did so by considering the net impression
of respondents' claims made on consumers giving due regard
to the influence various express statements had on consumers'
interpretations of implied claims, and noting the extrinsic
evidence in the record in the form of consumers' testimony as
to how they interpreted claims made to them.63
Using the net impression approach, prospective purchasers could
reasonably have interpreted the implied representations regarding oil
exploration and construction of a nuclear power plant in general, to
60. The ALJ concluded that the respondents were not liable for the misrepresentations because
"there must come a point where a respondent is permitted to exculpate himself." Id. at 97-98 (initial
decision).
61. Id. at 99 (initial decision).
62. In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 793 (1984). In determining the implied repre-
sentations contained in a particular advertisement, the Commission typically looks first at what
representations are implied on the face of the advertisement itself and, if that is not conclusive, then to
extrinsic evidence regarding the implied representation the ad can reasonably be interpreted as con-
veying to consumers. The focus is on the "overall, net impression" made by an advertisement rather
than how consumers might react to a particular element of an ad when taken out of the context of the
advertisement itself. Id. at 790; see also In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 178 n.26 (1984)
(Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Deception).
63. In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. at 148 (footnote omitted).
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convey the net impression that the land was a good investment because
of the presence or prospect of commercial and industrial development. 64
In light of the affirmative statements respondents made about the poten-
tial investment value of the property, the absence of any disclosures
regarding the risk associated with the purchase of said land and the
difficulty that purchasers might encounter in trying to resell it, the
Commission concluded that Southwest's omissions qualified as deceptive
acts or practices. 65
In finding the above representations material to consumers, the Com-
mission stated that it infers that all express representations are material.
In addition, the Commission found that implied representations and
omissions which pertained to the central characteristics of the land, such
as performance quality, cost, and purpose of the property were also
material. 66 The Commission generally describes a "material" claim as
one that is likely to affect a consumer's choice of or conduct regarding
a product. 67 In addition to express claims, one of the categories of
claims which is considered to be presumptively material includes implied
claims which pertain to the "central characteristics of a product or ser-
vice, such as those relating to its purpose, safety, efficacy, or cost." 68
Since it had already been concluded that the property's investment
value, oil exploration and undertakings, and commercial development
representations were inaccurate, the Commission also found that they
were likely to mislead reasonable consumers:
It is axiomatic that inaccurate representations about the invest-
ment value of land can mislead consumers . . . consumers'
64. Id. at 149.
65. Although the Commission did not directly use the terms "pure" or "non-pure" omission, its
conclusion that such omissions resulted in a deceptive practice under Section 5 indicates that it
considered the omissions in the instant case to be of the "non-pure" variety:
Respondents' omissions of information as to the riskiness of the land as investment
property were likewise deceptive acts or practices, because respondents failed to
disclose qualifying information needed to correct consumer misimpressions they created
... Consumers would not reasonably have anticipated these risks because respondents
expressly promised otherwise.
Id. at 150.
The Commission first distinguished "pure" from "non-pure" omissions in In re International
Harvester Co. See 104 F.T.C. 949, 1059 (1984). A pure omission was described as arising where "the
seller has simply said nothing, in circumstances that do not give any particular meaning to his silence."
Id. While the FTC has also noted that "pure" omissions can nevertheless lead to erroneous consumer
beliefs if the consumer had a false, pre-existing conceptions which the seller fails to correct, it has
refused to rule that these omissions rise to the level of deception since disclosure requirements would
be unduly burdensome to the seller and "very possibly represent a net harm for consumers." Id. at
1060.
66. See In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. at 816-17.
67. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984).
68. In re Thompson, 104 F.T.C. at 816-17.
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reasonable expectations about the land's investment value were
not met, and they were therefore likely to been mislead. More-
over, the record shows that consumers actually were mislead by
respondents' misrepresentations. 69
Similarly, the representations that the land offered for sale was
suitable for homesites, farming, and ranching constituted express and
implied representations that were material and likely to mislead reason-
able consumers. The representations described half-truths regarding the
significant costs and limitations that a consumer would encounter in
attempting to use the land accordingly. 70 Somewhat unclear, however, is
the cryptic footnote discussing the Commission's evaluation of such
implied representations. The footnote states: "It is important to remem-
ber that this evaluation does not focus on whether it was reasonable for
consumers to believe or act on the representations at issue. It focuses
instead on whether consumers could reasonably interpret the advertising
or statements to convey the implied representations." 7 1
Rather than emphasizing any actual consumer conduct, the Com-
mission looked toward the interpretation reasonable consumers could
take from such implied representations. This language may indicate a
small step backwards towards the "tendency to deceive" standard. How-
ever, it must be recognized that the language in the footnote was written
by one of the two Commissioners who most strongly opposed the
adoption of the "likely to mislead" standard. Although the Commis-
sion was unanimous in its decision to overrule the ALJ's dismissal of the
complaint in this case, Commissioner Bailey made it clear the unanimity
did not extend to the use of the "likely to mislead" standard:
Commissioner Bailey believes that respondents' practices
were deceptive and violated Section 5 of the FTC Act because
they tended to mislead a substantial number of consumers in a
material way by presenting respondents' land, inaccurately, as
attractive, money-making investment property that was suitable
for a wide range of uses and did not have any significant
drawbacks or limitations. She also agrees that these practices
were likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances in a material way, though she does not endorse
the use of this standard. 72
69. In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105 F.T.C. at 150.
70. Id. at 152.
71. Id. at 148 n.80.
72. Id. at 147 n.79.
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After the full Commission had reversed the'earlier dismissal, South-
west appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the
ruling. 73 In what was the first review of the revised deception standard
by a federal court, the Ninth Circuit also upheld the Commissions's
adoption of the new "likely to mislead" standard, indicating that the
new standard did in fact impose a higher burden of proof on the FTC:
Each of the three elements of the new standard challenged by
petitioner imposes a greater burden of proof on the FTC to
show a probable, not possible deception ("likely to mislead,"
not "tendency and capacity to mislead"). Second, the FTC
must show potential deception of "consumers acting reason-
ably in the circumstances," not just any consumers. Third, the
new standard considers as material only deceptions that are like-
ly to cause injury to a reasonably relying consumer, whereas
the old standard reached deceptions that a consumer might
have considered important, whether or not there was reliance. 74
Given the obvious deceptive nature of the representations at issue in
Southwest Sunsites, it is difficult to accept the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
without further inquiry. Clearly, the conduct and practices in question
would have been considered deceptive regardless of whether the tradi-
tional standard or its replacement had been employed. However, a
federal court had spoken to the burden of proof issue, thereby making
the analysis and rationale contained in future deception cases even more
critical to developing an informed opinion as to whether Cliffdale
constituted the significant change predicted by many commentators.
D. FIGGIE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
In 1986, the Commission had another opportunity to revisit the
Cliffdale standard with respect to alleged misleading representations in
advertisements. In In re Figgie International, Inc., 75 a manufacturer and
distributor of "Vanguard" heat detectors and smoke detectors had been
charged with representing in its promotional literature that the heat
detectors provided immediate early warning of fires and that they did so
faster than smoke detectors. 76 In its complaint, the FTC alleged that the
company had misrepresented that: 1) the Vanguard heat detectors
provide sufficient warning to allow safe escape from most residential
fires; and 2) the combination of Vanguard heat and smoke detectors
73. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. F.T.C., 785 F.2d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 1436.
75. 107 F.T.C. 313 (1986).
76. In re Figgie Int'l, Inc., 107 F.T.C. 313, 372 (1986).
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provide significantly greater fire warning protection for occupants than
smoke detectors alone. 77 The AU found the first of these representa-
tions deceptive since Figgie had not disclosed that dangerous levels of
smoke, heat, and carbon monoxide could develop before the heat
detectors would activate. He further found the second representation
deceptive since it was not disclosed that fire protection standards require
that a smoke detector be placed outside each sleeping area and on each
additional story of a residence.78
Figgie appealed the ALJ's initial decision on the ground that the
evidence on the record supported their claims that heat detectors provide
the necessary warning time to make a safe escape. 79 In evaluating
Figgie's arguments on appeal, Commissioner Azcuenaga reiterated the
Cliffdale deception elements, albeit in footnote language. Commissioner
Bailey's disagreement with the use of the new standard was again
dutifully noted in a footnote following the discussion of the standard to
be applied to the case.80 To analyze the alleged representation that
Vanguard heat detectors provide the necessary warning to allow safe
escape from most residential fires, the general claim was divided into two
component claims.
First, there was the representation that Vanguard heat detectors pro-
vide enough warning for safe escape from at least some fires, meaning
that the devices are effective as residential fire warning devices. This
representation was found to have been expressly made by statements in
Figgie's promotional materials such as: they provide "fast response to
hot fires," and "immediate early warning." In addition, Figgie implied-
ly offered that "thousands of lives have been saved by Vanguard heat
detectors," the product for sale as residential fire warning devices.8 t The
second component of the representation was the claim that Vanguard
heat detectors provide the necessary warning in most fires. This represen-
tation was found to have been made expressly through references to
statistics, such as 734 of 1107 (66.2%) of reported activations were the
77. Id. at 314 (complaint).
78. Id. at 372-73.
79. Id. at 373. Figgie also claimed that it was not given adequate notice of "the matters of fact
... asserted" in the proceeding as required under § 554(b) of the Administrative Procedures Act and
that the ALJ's decision was based on theories not alleged in the complaint. Id. However, the Com-
mission found both such claims to be without merit. Id. at 392-93.
80. In a footnote, the Commission stated:
As Commissioner Bailey noted in her Concurring and Dissenting Statement in Cliffdale,
she believes that a deceptive act or practice is best analyzed as one that has the tendency
or capacity to mislead a substantial number of consumers in a material way. While we
have followed the analysis used in Cliffdale, we agree that respondent's practices in this
case were deceptive under either analysis of a deceptive act or practice.
Id. at 374 n.6 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 377.
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types of fires that "might be responded to best by heat detectors," or
impliedly by statistics such as fifty-seven percent of reported fires of
known origins stated in kitchens or other areas where smoke detectors
should not be installed. 82 The evidence was more than sufficient to
affirm the ALJ's decision that both representations had, in fact, been
made by Figgie.
The Commission also agreed with the ALJ's conclusion that Figgie
had made express claims in its promotional materials by stating that
combining heat and smoke detectors provides significantly greater fire
warning protection than smoke detectors alone. 83 Figgie had repre-
sented that the combination provided significantly greater protection in
three different ways: 1) they may be located in kitchens and other areas
where smoke detectors are not recommended; 2) they are more reliable
since they require no maintenance and are mechanically and not
electrically operated; and 3) they may provide earlier response to hot
fires that "generate heat but little smoke." 84 These express claims also
passed the test of materiality. First, since the majority of representations
alleged in the complaint had been found to have been made expressly
by Figgie, they should be presumed to be material under the Com-
mission's longstanding presumption of materiality for such claims.
Second, the Commission also presumes that representations which relate
to the primary features of the product, such as effectiveness, are
material. 85 In this case, the single most important characteristic of a heat
detector was its effectiveness as a fire warning device. Therefore, Figgie
failed to present any evidence to rebut the presumptions of materiality. 86
Finally, the Commission addressed whether the representations in
this case were likely to mislead consumers. The ALJ found that the
"likely to mislead" standard was satisfied because Figgie had failed to
disclose certain qualifying information needed to correct impressions
left by the representations made expressly or impliedly in Figgie's pro-
motional materials. The Commission concluded that Vanguard heat de-
tectors do not provide the necessary warning to allow safe escape from
most residential fires and therefore, Figgie's representations to the con-
trary were likely to mislead and were deceptive. However, looking at the
three claims incorporated within the representation that heat detectors
were significantly better than smoke detectors alone, the Commission
found that only one of the claims were likely to mislead.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 378.
84. Id.
85. In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1057 (1984).
86. In re Figgie Int'l. Inc., 107 F.T.C. at 379.
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The Commission also examined the fact that even a relatively small
amount of additional protection from death or serious injury could be
considered significant by some consumers. The commission determined
that the representations that heat detectors provided a significant amount
of additional protection when installed in areas where smoke detectors
would not function properly, and the claims that heat detectors do
provide some additional protection because they are maintenance free
and mechanically rather than electrically operated, were found not to be
necessarily deceptive as long as they were substantiated and not exagger-
ated. 87 However, test results were examined which indicated that smoke
detectors give earlier warning of both smoldering fires and flaming fires.
In addition, the National Fire Protection Association concluded that "the
results of full-scale experiments conducted over the past several years
... indicate that detectable quantities of smoke precede detectable levels
of heat in nearly all cases." As such, the Commission determined that
Figgie's claim that heat detectors provide a significant additional
protection because they respond more quickly than smoke detectors to
hot, flaming fires was found to be false and misleading. 88
E. REMOVATRON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
In In re Removatron International Corp.,89 the Commission was
again dealing with express and implied claims, this time in advertise-
ments regarding the "Removatron" epilator, a tweezer-type hair remov-
al device employing radio frequency energy. In September 1985, the
FTC issued a complaint alleging that the company, under the direction
of its president, had represented through various advertising and promo-
tional materials that the Removatron device permanently removed hair
and was effective on a long-term basis. 90 The company was also charged
87. Commissioner Bailey dissented from that portion of the opinion which agreed that the heat
detectors provided significantly greater fire warning protection than smoke detectors alone and that
they are more reliable than smoke detectors. Id. at 396.
88. Id. at 392.
89. 111 F.T.C. 206 (1988), aff'd, 884 F.2d 1489 (1st. Cir. 1989).
90. In re Removatron Int'l Corp., I ll F.T.C. 206, 206-07 (1988) (complaint). The FTC's com-
plaint cited the following statements made by Removatron International in its advertising and
promotional materials:
I. Permanent hair removal;
2. Removatron. It lets you say goodbye to temporary solutions like messy cremes.;
3. The method is fully . . . effective . . . All hairs can be treated successfully ...
Removatron is more effective than any electrolysis machine on the market.;
4. Unwanted hair is no longer a problem, with a series of treatments, it can be
Removatroned forever!;
5. [T]he Removatron method uses modern electronic tweezers to EFFECTIVELY
remove unwanted hair ...




with representing that they possessed and relied upon a reasonable basis
for their permanency claims, when in fact they had none. The FTC's
complaint further charged that the company had falsely claimed that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had approved the Remova-
tron hair removal method, when in reality the FCC had only approved
the operation of the device at a particular radio frequency.
In July of 1987, the ALJ issued his decision and concluded both
that the representations alleged in the complaint had been made and that
they constituted unfair and deceptive acts or practices in violation of
Section 5. The order prohibited the company from making such repre-
sentations in the future unless they were supported by at least two con-
trolled, double-blind clinical studies. Additionally, the order prohibited
the company from making representations: 1) that the device removed
hair, unless they also disclosed that there is no reliable evidence that the
device provides anything more than temporary hair removal; and 2) that
the device was FCC approved, absent a clear and conspicuous statement
regarding the limitation of the FCC approval. Finally, the order required
the company to send to past purchasers a copy of the order and notifica-
tion not to rely on Removatron advertising or promotional materials
containing the prohibited representations and to provide a copy of the
order to future purchasers.
Removatron International appealed the ALJ's decision on three
grounds. First, the company challenged the conclusion that it had false-
ly represented the permanent nature of its hair removal achieved by the
Removatron device and that the company had a reasonable basis for
such claims. Second, the company questioned the judge's ruling that its
scientific evidence was insufficient to constitute a reasonable basis for the
claims, and his determination that in order for the company to show a
reasonable basis for its claims, it had to be able to provide reliable
scientific evidence consisting of at least two scientific studies. Third,
Removatron International claimed that the order was overbroad and had
no reasonable relationship to the alleged violations.
The Commission opinion began with a rather routine recitation of
the reasonable consumer standard, citing both Thompson and Cliffdale
as the controlling precedents. After a brief discussion of the Com-
mission's method of evaluating what express and implied claims might
be contained in an advertisement, the Commission focused on the ad-
vertisement as a whole, as well as the impact it had on the target audi-
ence: "In short, the Commission considers the net impression that the
ad makes on reasonable members of the public. We avoid interpre-
tations that would render an ad deceptive merely because it could be
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unreasonably misunderstood by a very small and unrepresentative
segment of the audience to whom it was directed." 91
The Commission agreed with the conclusions of the AU that Re-
movatron International's representations included both express and
implied claims regarding the permanency of hair removal. 92 The opin-
ion then turned to the representation that Removatron had adequate
scientific evidence substantiating the permanency claims and concluded
that since the company had failed to conduct any clinical tests on this
issue, the requisite scientific basis to substantiate such claims was
lacking. 93 In comparison to the lengthy analysis of the express and
implied claims allegedly made in the advertisements and the thorough
handling accorded the issue of substantiation, the majority opinion pro-
vides only a short, conclusory treatment of the issue of whether the
advertising violated the FTCA. The majority again cited Cliffdale in
holding:
The Commission will find an act or practice deceptive if, first,
there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second is
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the cir-
cumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice
is material. A claim is material if it involves information that is
important to consumers and hence, likely to affect their choice
of or conduct regarding the product. The Commission pre-
sumes as material express claims and implied claims pertaining
to a product's purpose, safety, efficacy or cost.94
Although the Commission's discussion reflected a clear intention to
follow the Cliffdale standard, the opinion made no explicit finding that
the representations were "likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably
under the circumstances." Instead, the Commission directly concluded
that the advertising and promotional materials that contained certain
representations concerning the permanency of the Removatron's
91. Id. at 292 (opinion of the commission) (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 293. Express claims included statements that hair removal would be "permanent," that
unwanted hair is "no longer a problem" and could be "removed" or "Removatroned forever." Id. at
292. Implied claims were found in statements that Removatron is "effective," is an "alternative to
electrolysis," or "works." Id. at 293.
93. Id. at 296. A lengthy portion of the Commission's opinion dealt with Removatron Inter-
national's contention that the ALJ had erred in determining that it did not possess adequate scientific
substantiation for their claims of permanency to meet the reasonable basis standard. The FTC re-
iterated the standard it had previously set forth in In re Thompson Medical Co, Inc., that when
advertising expressly or impliedly represents that it is based on scientific evidence, the advertiser must
have the level of substantiation, and in particular, must satisfy the relevant scientific community that
the claim is true. Id.; see In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 813 (1984); In re
Bristol-Meyers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 321 (1983).
94. In re Removatron Int'l Corp., Ill F.T.C. at 309 (citations omitted).
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treatments, and the representations that such claims were supported by
scientific proof, were without merit. These conclusory comments were
followed by an analysis of the issue of claim materiality. With respect to
materiality, the FTC determined that such claims were material insofar as
they pertained to the very purpose and efficacy of the product. There-
fore, Removatron International's failure to provide adequate substan-
tiation rendered their advertising false and deceptive in direct violation
of FTCA Sections 5 and 12.95
The Commission's decision was appealed to the First Circuit. While
numerous issues were advanced on appeal, Removatron International
specifically challenged the FTC's decision with respect to their findings
that: 1) their advertisements contained representations that the Remova-
tron could remove hair permanently in all people; and 2) such claims
were unsupported by adequate scientific evidence. Removatron Inter-
national claimed that the advertisements, while specifically stating that
treatments removed hair permanently and were effective, should have
been interpreted by the Commission to mean that the treatments per-
manently removed hair for most people most of the time. In support of
their "common-sense" approach, they pointed out two qualifying state-
ments made in one of their sales brochures. However, the court found
the qualifications made in other advertisements to be ineffective:
Each advertisement must stand on its own merits; even if other
advertisements contain accurate, non-deceptive claims, a viola-
tion may occur with respect to the deceptive ads. Disclaimers
or qualifications in any particular ad are not adequate to avoid
liability unless they are sufficiently prominent and unam-
biguous to change the apparent meaning of the claims and to
leave an accurate impression. Anything less is only likely to
cause confusion by creating contradictory double meanings.
The court also agreed with the Commission's findings with respect
to the lack of scientific substantiation for the claims made in the adver-
tisements. Unpersuaded by Removatron's argument that the use of the
phrase "clinically tested" would not be taken by a reasonable person as
meaning "supported by rigorous scientific tests," the court noted:
"Regardless of any actual differences there may be between 'clinical'
95. Section 12 of the FTCA prohibits false advertising of any food, drug, or device. The statute
defines a "device" as "any instrument apparatus, or contrivance intended to affect the structure or
function of the body." 15 U.S.C. § 55(d) (1994). The Commission determined that the Removatron
fell within the purview of this definition. In re Renmovatron Int'l Corp., III F.T.C. at 309 (opinion of
the Commission).
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and 'scientific' evidence, petitioners have offered no basis for us to find
that laypeople would make such a fine distinction.
Removatron also challenged the requirement of the Commission's
order that it have at least one well-controlled scientific study before they
would be permitted to make a claim of permanent hair removal in their
advertisements. The company argued that regardless of the fact that any
well-controlled scientific study was lacking, the material it did possess
amounted to a "reasonable basis" for their claims of permanent hair
removal. The court held that "[w]ithout such a study, petitioners could
not, as a matter of law, have a reasonable basis for their establishment
claims. Without such a reasonable basis their ads were deceptive and in
violation of [Section 5]." They further noted that such a requirement
prevents the making of even non-establishment claims with respect to the
permanency of the treatments and held that the Commission's require-
ment was a reasonable "fencing in" provision and within the Commis-
sion's discretionary powers.
Finally, they challenged the order's requirement that they send a
copy of the order and a notice to all past purchasers, and that they
include a disclaimer in any advertisement which includes any claims of
hair removal stating such removal is only temporary. The court distin-
guished the disclaimer and notifications required here from corrective
advertising, since the disclaimers were not required in all future adver-
tisements regardless of the content of those advertisements. Rather, the
court held that the disclaimers here were only a form of affirmative
advertising, required only when it was claimed the Removatron could
remove hair, and could be avoided simply by ceasing to make such
claims.
Despite its relatively brief treatment of the deception standard, the
Removatron case was significant in two ways. First, it further clarified
the issue of at what point the "net impression" of the representations
should be measured. Removatron International argued that the "net
impression" made by the representations should be based upon the sales
process as a whole, rather than by reference to the impressions left
by any individual ads. However, both the Commission and the First
Circuit rejected such an argument and held that it was instead proper to
consider the net impression of the individual ads without regard to the
context provided by the advertising campaign or subsequent qualifica-
tions of those representations. Second, Removatron was significant for
its clarification of the advertising substantiation doctrine. In determining
the necessary level of substantiation for the company's claims of perma-
nent hair removal, both the Commission and the Court held that a
"reasonable basis" for making such claims could only be accomplished
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by having well-controlled scientific studies. Both also adopted the ALJ's
finding that such a determination could be made regardless of whether a
specific analysis of the six Pfizer factors is undertaken, so long as the
advertisements in question expressly or impliedly represent that such
scientific proof existed.
F. RELIABLE MORTGAGE CORPORATION
The next opportunity for the full Commission to address the
reasonable consumer arose in the unusual circumstances of an interlocu-
tory order issued by the Commission in its dismissal of a show cause
proceeding. This opportunity developed during the FTC's reconsidera-
tion of a decision and order issued originally in In re Reliable Mortgage
Corp.96 Reliable's chief executive officer had violated the Truth-in-
Lending Act (TILA) and Regulation Z by advertising a mortgage
interest rate without disclosing the annual percentage rate (APR). In
January 1989, a full fourteen years after issuance of the original order
against Reliable, the FTC issued an order to show cause as to why the
proceeding should not be reopened. The agency staff urged the Com-
mission to modify its prior decision to expressly state that the practice at
issue, advertising a finance charge without state the APR, also constituted
an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of the FTCA. The
proceeding was reopened in September 1989.
The FTC staff suggested that the language of the TILA and its
legislative history indicated Congressional intent to classify the TILA
violation as an unfair or deceptive act or practice under sections of the
FTCA. Alternatively, it was urged that the act which constituted the
TILA violation would independently meet the unfairness and deception
criteria under Section 5.97 Although the Commission rejected both
arguments and dismissed the show cause proceeding, the Commission
again initiated its analysis of the deception claim with the Cliffdale
standard, referring to it as "the deception standard." 98 However, much
to the concern of Chairman Steiger, the opinion went on to list two
alternatives by which it might determine the practice was deceptive. First,
Thompson was cited pursuant to the proposition that under certain
circumstances the Commission may determine without extrinsic evidence
that an advertisement conveys a particular claim and is misleading.
Second, the majority opinion noted that they could review the record to
determine if the staff had proven that the practice was deceptive. The
96. 113 F.T.C. 816 (1990).
97. In re Reliable Mortgage Corp., 113 F.T.C. 816, 818 (1990).
98. Id. at 819-20 (emphasis added).
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Commission commented on the unfortunate situation created by this
lack of evidence:
There is simply no supporting evidence from which we can
conclude that consumers were in fact misled by the advertising
in question. Nor can we resolve whether consumers believed
the advertised rate represented the APR. In short, absent a
record with supporting evidence, we cannot find that Reliable's
practice was deceptive.99
Perhaps more instructive than the Commission's opinion in Reliable
Mortgage of the reasonable consumer standard is the separate concur-
ring statement of Chairman Steiger. She expressed her concern that the
Commission's opin ion could be read to require a finding that consumers
were actually misled by the advertising at issue before a finding of
deception could be made.' 00 Chairman Steiger pointed out that al-
though the record in this particular case was devoid of any showing of
actual deception, such evidence was not necessary in light of previous
case law and the Policy Statement. 0 ,
G. KRAFT, INC.
In the most recent opinion by the full Commission addressing the
evolving deception standard, the FTC analyzed In re Kraft, Inc. 102 The
case addressed whether Kraft's advertisements for its Kraft Singles
American Pasteurized Cheese Food "Kraft Singles," violated the FTCA
by materially misrepresenting the product's calcium content and relative
calcium benefit in various broadcast and print advertisements that ran
nationwide from 1985-87. In its complaint, the FTC alleged that Kraft
had misrepresented, directly or by implication, that a slice of Kraft
Singles contains the same amount of calcium as five ounces of milk (the
"milk equivalency") claim, that Kraft Singles contain more calcium
than do most imitation cheese slices (the "imitation superiority" claim),
and that the company misrepresented that it had a reasonable basis
for making such claims (the "reasonable basis" claim). The ALJ found
that the Kraft advertisements contained material misrepresentations
regarding both the calcium equivalency and imitation superiority claims,
and prohibited Kraft from making such claims in its advertising of
99. Id. at 820.
100. Id. at 823 (separate statement of Chairman Steiger).
101. Id. (separate statement of Chairman Steiger).
102. 114 F.T.C. 40 (1991), aff d, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993).
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any "individually wrapped slices of pasteurized process, imitation or
substitute cheese products."103
Kraft appealed the ALJ's decision and order to the full Commis-
sion, citing four principal arguments: 1) that the ALI did not have the
authority to base his findings solely on a review and analysis of the
challenged ads; 2) that the ALJ erred in his finding that, based on the
extrinsic evidence in the record, consumers would take the alleged impli-
cations from the ads; 3) that the ALJ erred in determining that the
calcium claims were material to consumers; and 4) that the ALJ's order
would amount to an unconstitutional restraint on commercial speech by
preventing truthful informative advertising for the covered products. 104
Despite Kraft's arguments, the Commission agreed with the ALJ's
finding of liability and proceeded to expand the order's scope to in-
clude not only individually wrapped products, but also "any product
that is a cheese, related cheese, imitation cheese, or substitute cheese" as
was originally proposed by the complainants' counsel in the notice
order. 105
The Commission's opinion in Kraft began the analysis of the legal
framework in terms of its traditional reference to the reasonable
consumer standard: "The Commission will deem an advertisement to
convey a claim if consumers, acting reasonably under the circumstances,
would interpret the advertisement to contain that message."106 The
majority then distinguished between express and implied claims, making
it clear that both express and implied claims may subject a company to
liability if such claims are deceptive, whether or not the deception was
intentional. 107
After reiterating the Commission's allegiance to the reasonable
consumer standard, the opinion then addressed the first of two
arguments made by Kraft on appeal by describing the process by which
the Commission evaluates what claims an advertisement might convey to
103. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 112-13 (1991) (initial decision). The ALJ rejected the
broader scope proposed by the notice order attached to the complaint because he concluded that Kraft
had not intended to make the representations, that there was insufficient evidence of a persistent,
long-term pattern of deceptive advertising, and that the broader scope of the order would expose
Kraft to liability in the future for "unpredictable interpretations of its ads." Id.
104. Id. at 119.
105. Id. at 149 (final order).
106. Id. at 120 (opinion of the Commission). Citing a recent study of the cereal industry by the
FTC's Bureau of Economics which indicated the effectiveness of advertising in disseminating
information on health benefits, the majority noted that the standard was "intended to ensure that the
flow of useful and accurate product information conveyed to consumers through advertising is not
deterred." Id. at 120 n.7.
107. The Commission noted that "Advertisers can be liable for misleading consumers by in-
nuendo as well as by outright false statements." Id. at 121 (citing In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C.
110, 170-71, 175 n.4, 176-77 (1984) (Federal Trade Commission Policy Statement on Deception)).
4691998]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
reasonable consumers. The Commission expressly rejected Kraft's argu-
ment that as a matter of law, the agency could not reach a conclusion
regarding claims made by an advertisement without relying on extrinsic
evidence. The Commission stated that in some instances the advertise-
ment contains language or depictions which are clear enough to enable
them to conclude, without examining other evidence, that the advertise-
ments convey a particular implied claim to consumers acting reasonably
under the circumstances. 108 If the FTC is unable to conclude with
confidence, based on a review of the advertisement itself, that an ad can
reasonably be read to contain a particular implied claim, it will not find
the advertisement to have made such a claim unless extrinsic evidence
permits the conclusion that such a reading is reasonable. 109 Finally, the
Commission summed up its response to Kraft's first two arguments by
noting that only a small number of reasonable consumers need to be
misled in order to uphold a finding of deception:
Whether looking at evidence from the ad itself, extrinsic evi-
dence, or both, the Commission considers the overall, net
impression made by the advertisement in determining what
messages may reasonably be ascribed to it. An interpretation
may be reasonable even though it is not shared by a majority
of consumers in the relevant class, or by particularly sophisti-
cated consumers. A material practice that misleads a signifi-
cant minority of reasonable consumers is deceptive.Il0
Although the methodology employed by the Commission in evaluating
implied claims was not new, it is perhaps the most detailed analysis of
such claims that the Commission has produced. In fact, one commis-
sioner has recently referred to Commissioner Owen's opinion in Kraft as
"a clear statement of the Commission's approach to evaluating implied
claims-the central question of many deceptive advertising cases."lll
Once again, the Commission only briefly addressed the issue of
whether the claims were likely to mislead a reasonable consumer.
108. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. at 121 (opinion of the Commission).
109. The Commission indicated that extrinsic evidence could include:
reliable results from methodologically sound consumer surveys . . . common usage of
terms . . . generally accepted principles drawn from market research showing that
consumers generally respond in a certain manner to advertisements that are presented in
a particular way ... [and] the opinions of expert witnesses in the proceeding as to how
the advertisement might reasonably be interpreted, if such opinions are adequately
supported.
Id. (citing In re Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 790 (1984)).
110. Id. at 122 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
111. Remarks of Chairman Janet D. Steiger before the American Advertising Federation Govern-
ment Regulations Conference, March 12, 1991, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,052.
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Having found that certain calcium claims were implied in Kraft's adver-
tisements, the Commission determined that the claims were likely to
mislead a reasonable consumer based on the fact that Kraft had not
appealed the ALJ's findings that these claims were false and unsub-
stantiated. As such, the Commission adopted the AL's findings on the
issue. However, the FTC also noted that it was reasonable to presume
that consumers were not generally aware that the calcium in the five
ounces of milk is reduced during the processing of Kraft Singles, nor
that imitation cheese slices may be fortified with calcium. Consequently,
because reasonable consumers would not be generally aware of these
facts, the claims were likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably
under the circumstances.11 2
The Kraft Commission did include a detailed discussion of the
materiality element of the reasonable consumer standard in addressing
the company's third argument on appeal. It was noted that several types
of claims are considered to be presumptively material, such as express
claims, implied claims where evidence suggests such claims were intend-
ed, and claims or omissions involving health, safety, or other areas with
which reasonable consumers would be concerned. 113 Without directly
contradicting the ALI's conclusion that the implied calcium claims were
presumptively material since they made significant health claims, the
Commission elected to examine the issue of materiality of the implied
"milk equivalency" and "imitation superiority" claims individually.
As to the "milk equivalency" claims, considerable weight was
placed on Kraft's own survey results which suggested that calcium was
important to consumers, especially those with calcium deficiencies. The
evidence in the record also suggested Kraft had designed the marketing
campaign to target these particular consumers. With respect to this evi-
dence, the Commission concluded that the company believed that its
marketing effort directly contributed to these consumers making deci-
sions to purchase.' 14 As for the "imitation superiority" claims, the
AL's finding that Kraft had intended that the advertisements convey
such a claim was affirmed, and from this finding it was proper to
presume materiality. 115 This conclusion was further supported by the
112. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. at 133 (opinion of the Commission).
113. Id. (citing In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. at 816-817).
114. Id. at 137. The Commission stated: "We find it reasonable to infer from Kraft's persistence
in using the challenged ad copy under these circumstances, and in making only minor modifications,
that Kraft believed this copy contributed to consumer purchases of Kraft Singles." Id.
115. Id. at 138. The Commission rejected Kraft's argument that its materiality survey, which
showed calcium ranked seventh out of nine characteristics in terms of the participants' decision to
purchase Kraft Singles, was proof the imitation superiority claim was not material to consumers. Id.
Instead, it focused on the survey's conclusion that over 71% of participants ranked a source of
calcium as an "extremely" or "very important" factor in their purchasing decision. Id. at 138 n.30.
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fact that the advertisement actually led to increased sales of Kraft Singles
even though the product was priced about forty percent higher than
other imitation cheese slices.
As previously mentioned, the FTC rejected Kraft's argument that
the First Amendment required reliance on external evidence in determin-
ing the existence of implied claims. The company's fourth argument,
that the finding of liability fails to distinguish meaningfully between
lawful nondeceptive and unlawful deceptive advertising thereby violating
the First Amendment, was also rejected. Kraft had essentially claimed
that because certain advertisements not challenged in the proceeding
would be subject to the terms of the order as it was written, it was
unconstitutionally vague in distinguishing what constitutes lawful and
unlawful advertising. The Commission responded that the company's
attempt to invalidate the order by virtue of reliance on advertisements
that were not in issue was improper given the scope of the material
evidence as presented.116
After the opinion of the full commission was handed down in
January of 1991, Kraft filed an appeal with the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals arguing, inter alia, that the FTC erred as a matter of law in not
requiring extrinsic evidence of consumer deception or, alternatively, that
the FTC's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.11 7 They
argued both: 1) that there was insufficient evidence suggesting that the
ads contained a milk equivalency claim; and 2) even if they did, there
was a lack of evidence that such claims were material to consumers. 118
The other major issue on appeal involved the extent of the Commis-
sion's order, which by its terms applied to all Kraft cheeses and cheese-
related products. In that regard, Kraft argued that the order was unconsti-
tutionally broad because it bans constitutionally protected commercial
speech, and it was not rationally related to Kraft's violation of the Act.119
116. Id. at 132-33. The Commission supported its conclusion by stating:
It is no defense to a finding of deception in this case to assert that unchallenged ads might
also be deceptive . . . Moreover, it would be inappropriate to speculate on the likelihood
that we would find the unchallenged ads to which respondent refers to be deceptive,
since a full record on the potential of those ads to deceive has not been developed and is
not now before us.
Id.
117. In re Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909
(1993).
118. Id. at 322.
119. Id. at 324-327. The court held in favor of the Commission with regard to both of Kraft's
arguments in this respect. See id. First, it held that the scope of the order was not broader than
reasonably necessary to prevent deception, and thus not violative of the Kraft's First Amendment
rights. See id. Second, it held that the scope was reasonably related to the violation such that the order
constituted a valid multi-product order ("Fencing-in" order) necessary to prevent Kraft from engaging
in similar practices in the future. Id. at 326.
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Like most other appeals of deception cases, Kraft did not fare any
better in court than it had done with the full Commission. The Seventh
Circuit declined to review the FTC's findings de novo and instead
reaffirmed that the appropriate standard for review in such cases was the
substantial evidence test.120 The court next turned to the issue of the use
of extrinsic evidence in determining the claims conveyed by an advertise-
ment when implied claims are at issue. While the court rejected Kraft's
arguments, it did acknowledge that they had "some force as a matter of
policy."121 Ultimately, the long line of precedents which recognized the
FTC's authority to use its own reasoned analysis rather than extrinsic
evidence prevailed over policy.122 The court held that: "[T]he Commis-
sion may rely on its own reasoned analysis to determine what claims,
including implied ones, are conveyed in a challenged advertisement,
so long as those claims are reasonably clear on the face of the
advertisement."1 23
Kraft's allegations of a lack of substantial evidence supporting the
FTC's conclusions were also decided in favor of the Commission. The
court agreed with the Commission's findings that the ads' visual and
verbal emphasis on the fact that five ounces of milk go into a slice of
Kraft Singles created a link to calcium content and strongly implied that
the consumer gets the calcium found in five ounces of milk. The fact
that the ads were literally true-that singles were made from five ounces
of milk and that they do have a high concentration of calcium (about
seventy percent of that in five ounces of milk)-was rejected because the
court agreed that an average consumer is not likely to know that thirty
percent of the calcium is lost in processing. 124 Finally, the court also
rejected Kraft's clam that materiality should turn not on the overall
subject matter of the claim, i.e., calcium content generally, but rather on
120. Id. at 318.
121. Id. at 319. The court stated:
Our holding does not diminish the force of Kraft's argument as a policy matter, and,
indeed, the extensive body of commentary on the subject make[s] a compelling argument
that reliance on extrinsic evidence should be the rule rather than the exception. Along
those lines, the Commission would be well advised to adopt a consistent position on
consumer methodology-advertisers and the FTC, it appears, go round and round on this
issue-so that any uncertainty is reduced to an absolute minimum.
Id. at 321.
122. See F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); F.T.C. v. Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 738 F.2d 554, 563
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); American Home Products Corp. v. F.T.C., 695 F.2d
681, 687 n. 10 (3d Cir. 1982); Simeon Management Corp. v. F.T.C., 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n. 11 (9th Cir.
1978); National Bakers Servs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1964); In re Thompson
Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984).
123. Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 319
124. Id. at 322.
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whether consumers would have acted differently with the specific
knowledge that Singles contained only seventy percent of the calcium
contained in five ounces of milk.125
In addition to being the most recent discussion by the full Commis-
sion of the deception standard, the Kraft case is important to the law of
deception for three reasons. First, it settled, at least for the time being,
the issue of whether the FTC can determine for itself what implied claims
are conveyed by a particular advertisement. By rejecting Kraft's argu-
ment that extrinsic evidence of consumer deception must be presented,
the court tacitly approved the considerable degree of discretion with
which the FTC has been entrusted through prior case precedents. 126 The
second major impact of the Kraft ruling was the reaffirmation that even
literally true statements, such as Kraft singles are made from five ounces
of milk and that they do have a high concentration of calcium, can be
deceptive by leaving consumers with a misleading impression about the
calcium content. 127 Third, the court refused to adopt Kraft's argument
that any determination of materiality must turn on whether the claim
itself (milk equivalency), rather than the subject matter of the claim
(calcium content generally), is likely to affect the consumer's conduct or
decision with regard to a product. Instead, the court properly upheld the
Commission's conclusion of materiality since it was clear that consumers
place great importance on calcium consumption and it could thus be
reasonably inferred that a claim which exaggerated the calcium content
by thirty percent was a nutritionally significant claim that would affect
consumers' purchasing decisions.128
H. PANTRON I CORPORATION 12 9
The most recent addition to the Cliffdale line of cases is, unlike the
preceding seven cases, not a decision of the full Commission. Instead,
FTC v. Pantron I Corp. originated in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California upon the FTC's request for an injunction
against the seller of the hair loss product known as "The Helsinki Formu-
la."130 The FTC, in seeking the injunction, claimed that the company
125. Id. at 323-24. See In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 175 (1984) (Federal Trade
Commission Policy Statement on Deception stating that a claim is material when it is "likely to affect
the consumer's conduct or decision with regard to a product").
126. See Dennis P. Stolle, Note, The FTC's Reliance on Extrinsic Evidence in Cases of Deceptive
Advertising: A Proposal for Interpretive Rulemaking," Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F. 2d 311 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993), 74 NEB. L. REV. 352 (1995).
127. Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 322.
128. Id. at 323-24.
129. F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at 1090.
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and its president and sole owner, Hal Z. Lederman, had made represen-
tations both that the product was effective and that its effectiveness had
been substantiated by scientific evidence. 131
At trial, the FTC introduced the testimony of three medical experts,
all of whom concluded that the two ingredients in the Helsinki Formula
that the company claimed were effective, polysorbate-60 and poly-
sorbate-80, had never been scientifically proven to reduce hair loss or
promote hair regrowth.1 32 In support of this, the FTC also introduced
two studies, both of which were randomized and double-blinded, and
one of which was placebo-controlled, that both concluded that
polysorbate-based products were ineffective in stopping hair loss and
promoting hair regrowth.1 33 In its defense, Pantron introduced the
testimony of eighteen satisfied users who had experienced hair regrowth
or a reduction in hair loss. They also offered the results of two studies
conducted by European medical doctors which, although they did not
conform to scientific standard generally-accepted in the U.S., were
nevertheless claimed by Pantron to show that polysorbate-based products
were effective treatments for baldness. In addition, the company relied
for support on the results of an impromptu survey of users, and the fact
that over half the company's orders came from repeat customers. Final-
ly, the company emphasized that less than three percent of customers
had ever exercised their right under the money-back guarantee.134
In September of 1991, the district court held that while Pantron had
made the representations of efficacy and scientific support that the FTC
had alleged, there was "no evidence in the record to support a con-
tention that the Helsinki Formula is wholly ineffective . . ." and that the
anecdotal evidence suggested "that the compound works for some
people some of the time."135 Thus, the court determined that the FTC
had failed to carry its burden of proving that Pantron made an entirely
false claim when it represented that the Helsinki Formula was effective.
However, the court went on to conclude that because there was no "scien-
tifically valid evidence" that the ingredient in the Formula was "effec-
tive for treatment of hair loss or for inducing growth," the FTC had
"marginally carried its burden on the charge of falsity in defendant's
claims of scientific proof."136
131. Id. at 1095.
132. Id. at 1092-93.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1093-94.
135. Id. at 1094.
136. Id.
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As a result, in its order the court barred Pantron from making any
claims that scientific evidence establishes the effectiveness of the Helsinki
Formula, while at the same time allowing then to state that "the Helsinki
Formula, or a product similar thereto was the subject of medical investi-
gative work by responsible European Physicians," if the statement was
accompanied by a disclosure that the work did not conform to "recog-
nized standards in the United States for medical/scientific studies." The
order also allowed Pantron to state that the Formula was "effective to
some extent for some people in dealing with male pattern baldness," as
long as such statement was also accompanied by a similar disclosure to
the effect that it is not explained or supported by scientific studies recog-
nized under standards in use in the United States.137 Both parties
appealed the decision of the district court, and in 1994 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals overruled the district court, and directed that the parts
of the order challenged by the FTC be modified.138
The FTC's primary arguments on appeal were directed at the
district courts conclusion that there was "no evidence" that the Formula
was "wholly ineffective" and that it "most probably works some of the
time for a lot of people."1 39 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit was squarely
faced with the issue of whether it was lawful for a seller to represent a
product as "effective" when its efficacy results solely from a "placebo
effect."1 40 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the answer to that question
was "no" and that the representations made by the company, both the
effectiveness claim itself and the claim that the Formula's effectiveness
had been substantiated by scientific evidence, constituted a "false adver-
tisement" under section 12 and was thus an "unfair or deceptive act or
practice in or affecting commerce" within the meaning of FTCA Section
5. However, en route to reaching its conclusion the court made a signifi-
cant step toward judicial recognition of the "reasonable consumer"
standard first enunciated in Cliffdale:
In its own adjudications, the F.T.C. has to some extent clarified
the legal standards which apply in section 12 cases. In Cliff-
dale Assocs., the Commission announced a three-part test for
determining whether an advertisement is misleading and
deceptive in violation of section 12 . . . The Commission has
consistently adhered to the Cliffdale Associates standard.
Although we have not heretofore explicitly adopted the test, we
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1095.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1090 n..
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have stated that "[t]he new standard became binding on the
F.T.C. when it was adopted in Cliffdale Associates." As we
previously suggested in Southwest Sunsites, we believe that the
general outlines of the Cliffdale Associates test set forth the
appropriate general principles for determining whether adver-
tising is deceptive. Except as noted below. we adopt this
standard. 141
Applying the Cliffdale "reasonable consumer" standard to the case
at hand, the court found that there was no question that Pantron had
represented that the Helsinki Formula was effective, or that the effective-
ness claims were material to consumers. Since Pantron did not challenge
either of these conclusions, however, the court made it clear that they
were not deciding whether the representation made must be "likely to
affect [consumers'] choice of, or conduct regarding, a product" in
order to be material. 142 The only question left before the court, then,
was whether Pantron's representations were likely to mislead or deceive
consumers. At this point, the court carefully limited its holding. Since
the case involved express objective product claims rather than implied
claims that could be interpreted in different ways by consumers, the
court specifically refrained from making any conclusion regarding the
applicability of Cliffdale.143
However, the court did hold that the district court had erred when it
concluded that Pantron's efficacy representations did not amount to
false advertising. They declared that the "overwhelming weight" of
evidence made it clear that any effectiveness was due solely to the
Formula's placebo effect.144 Reversing the lower court, the Ninth Circuit
held that the FTC was not required to prove that a product is "wholly
ineffective" in order to show that a seller's representations are false
and/or misleading. Where a product's effectiveness arises solely as a
result of a placebo effect, any claim of effectiveness will be misleading
because "the [product] is not inherently effective, its result being
attributable to the psychosomatic effect produced by the advertising and
marketing of the product."1 45 Accordingly, it held that Pantron's claim
of effectiveness was misleading under the reasonable consumer standard
because the evidence developed under accepted standards of scientific
research demonstrated that the product had no force beyond its placebo
effect. The court then ordered that the injunction be modified to
141. Id. at 1095.
142. Id. at 1096 n.20.
143. Id. at 1096n.21.
144. Id. at 1097.
145. Id. at 1100.
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prohibit Pantron from making any representations concerning the
Formula's effectiveness at all and from providing any scientific support
for such claims, regardless of any qualifying disclosures. 146
IV. CONCLUSION
Due to its unusual origin, the impact of the Pantron I case may not
necessarily be felt at the Commission level. However, its importance
cannot be discounted merely because it arose outside of the FTC's
adjudicative process. For the first time, a federal circuit court placed an
imprimatur on the "reasonable consumer" standard first set forth in the
October 1983 Deception Policy Statement, and ultimately adopted in
revised form in the Cliffdale case. This express adoption of the current
FTC subjective standard cannot be overlooked, especially since the Ninth
Circuit is not unaccustomed to handling appeals from FTC decisions.
In light of the foregoing, the key question is whether the Cliffdale
Associates case brought forth any substantive change to the subjective
standard used by the Commission in evaluating deception cases. Perhaps
this question is answered, at least in part, by considering the number of
Commission decisions in deception cases since 1984. There was a flurry
of cases immediately following Cliffdale that abated with the decision in
Kraft. The question remains whether this is a coincidence, or merely an
indication that it is the vigor with which the Commission pursues
deception cases that is most important, rather than the actual wording of
the standard. Given the declining number of deception cases, along with
Commission opinion language that strongly suggests that the practices in
question would likely have been found deceptive under the traditional
standard, it appears that the subjective change has not had the effect that
Chairman Miller's opponents predicted.
146. Id. at 1101.
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